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Discrimination, Deceit, and Legal Decoys:
The Diversion of After-Acquired Evidence
and the Focus Restored by McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Company
ELISSA J. PREHEIM*
"[I]t was a gold mine or a godsend. All you have to do is take an employee and find out
something that they have done wrong, some misconduct that you never knew about and,
boom, there goes their civil rights claim."'
INTRODUCTION
Christine McKennon worked for almost forty years as a confidential secretary for the
newspaper The Nashville Banner (the "Banner"), with consistently excellent evaluations.2
However, after McKennon had received warnings that she may be laid off because the
Banner was experiencing financial problems, the Comptroller instructed Mrs. McKennon
to shred records containing information about the firm's financial status.3 "[I]n an attempt
to learn information regarding [her] job security concerns' and for her 'insurance' and
'protection,"' 4 McKennon surreptitiously copied tefi pages of the confidential documents,
took them home, and showed them to her husband.' Without knowledge of this breach of
confidentiality, the Banner discharged sixty-two-year-old McKennon in October 1990
as part of an alleged workforce reduction instituted for financial purposes.6 Nevertheless,
during that year, the Banner hired two new secretaries, ages thirty-six and twenty-six.7
Mrs. McKennon subsequently filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), and, during Mrs. McKennon's deposition in the ensuing
litigation, the Banner first discovered her previous actions involving the financial
documents.9 Had the Banner known of her misconduct, it would have discharged her
immediately." Consequently, the Banner filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that McKennon was not entitled to any relief from the allegedly discriminatory discharge;
thus, the Banner was relieved of all liability." Finding that the nature and materiality of
her misconduct justified her dismissal as a matter of law, a Tennessee district court
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Indiana University-Bloomington; B.A., 1993, Northwestern University. I wish to thank
Dean Julia Lamber for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Note.
1. Michael Terry, attorney for Christine McKennon, relating a statement made by a management lawyer who
described the operation of the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Supreme Cour Issues Two Important Decisions (National
Public Radio broadcast, "All Things Considered," Jan. 23, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
2. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 540 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
3. Brief for Petitioner at 4, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995) (No. 93-1543).
4. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, McKennon (No. 93-1543).
6. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), offd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th
Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995); Brief for Respondent at 4, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115
S. Ct. 879 (1995) (No. 93-1543).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 3, MeKennon (No. 93-1543).
8. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
9. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 605-06.
10. Id. at 608.
11. Id. at 606.
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entered summary judgment for the newspaper on the basis that McKennon sustained no
injury from the alleged ADEA violation. 2 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 3
This harsh result is a product of the "after-acquired evidence" doctrine that several
federal circuits have applied in employment discrimination litigation. Established by the
Tenth Circuit in 1988,14 the doctrine permits employers charged with discriminatory
practices to escape liability by showing that the plaintiff-employee engaged in
misconduct of her own-a fact the employer discovered only after the alleged
discrimination occurred and often as a direct result of the litigation commenced to redress
that discrimination. Upon discovery of the employee's prior wrongdoing, courts have
entered summary judgment against employees based on the rationale that the employee
would have been discharged due to her own misconduct. Employee misconduct,
particularly instances of rdsumd fraud, is prevalent in the American workplace 5 and
employers have argued that the after-acquired evidence doctrine properly prevents
employees from reaping unjust benefits from their wrongdoing.'6 The Supreme Court
disagreed.
In the unanimous decision of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 7 the
Supreme Court restored the underlying principles and enforcement mechanisms of federal
antidiscrimination statutes threatened by the after-acquired evidence doctrine." As the
Court recognized, allowing after-acquired evidence to act as a complete bar to liability
is unsupported by bxisting law and legal principles, and is antithetical to the provisions
and goals of federal civil rights law. Furthermore, courts must limit the use of after-
acquired evidence to the remedial stage of litigation if the federal antidiscrimination
statutes are to continue to function as effective devices for eradicating discrimination in
employment. Providing guidelines as how properly to apply after-acquired evidence in
the remedial phase of the litigation, the Supreme Court declared, as a general rule, that
neither reinstatement nor front pay 9 would be available to claimants." Courts may award
backpay, but only to the point at which the after-acquired evidence was discovered. 2'
Finally, the Court authorized the lower courts to "consider taking into further account
extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party."'
12. Id. at 608..
13. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), revd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
14. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
15. A 1988 Equifax, Inc. study revealed that almost one-third of 200 randomly selected risum6s misstated dates of
employment by at least three months, presumably to conceal disfavorable and brief employment tenures. Of the applicants,
11% gave false reasons for leaving previous positions, 4% misrepresented job titles, 3% fabricated employers, 3% listed
jobs never held, and 3% falsely claimed college degrees. Joan E. Rigdon, Deceptive Resumes Can Be Door-Openers but
Can Become an Employee 's Undoing, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992, at BI.
16. George D. Mesritz, "After-Acquired" Evidence ofPre-Employment Misrepresentations: An Effective Defense
Against Wrongful Discharge Claims, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 215, 226 (1992) ("Employers are well-positioned to argue
that, as a matter of public policy, the courts should not condone dishonesty and permit employees who fraudulently obtain
jobs the opportunity to recover 'windfall' jury awards .... 2).
17. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
18. The Court was prepared to address the issue two years ago, but the parties settled before the case could be heard.
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
19. For an explanation of "front pay," see infra note 189.





Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy's succinct opinion belies the fierce debate and
circuit split that the issue of after-acquired evidence has engendered.' Though the length
of the opinion mirrors the brief existence of the doctrine, only a thorough examination
of the doctrine's origin and development can frame the wealth of issues and legal
arguments generated by after-acquired evidence. With this background, one can better
identify inconsistencies in the Court's opinion and remaining uncertainties as lower
courts apply the remedy-specific approach.
This Note concludes that, while the Court appropriately limited consideration of after-
acquired evidence to the remedial phase of liability, the remedy-specific approach
articulated by the Eleventh Circuit is more faithful to the goals of federal
antidiscrimination law. Part I outlines the current frameworks allocating burdens of proof
in disparate treatment litigation, giving special attention to the mixed-motives
analysis-which shares its origin with the after-acquired evidence doctrine-and the
impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part II traces the emergence of the doctrine and
the development of the variations delimiting the split in the federal circuit courts. Part III
analyzes MeKennon and the various approaches of the circuits. Finally, Part IV proposes
the treatment of after-acquired evidence which is most faithful to the purposes and goals
of antidiscrimination statutes, and which can provide guidance to lower courts as they
apply McKennon's remedy-specific approach.
I. PROVING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSIS
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 to "assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices
which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens."'as In addition to this "primary, prophylactic objective," it is also the purpose of
23. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. Apparently, little debate raged on the high bench. During oral
arguments before the Supreme Court on November 2, 1994, seven Justices appeared hostile to the concept that an
employer may avoid liability in an otherwise valid discrimination suit. High Court HearsArguments in Age Discrimination
Suit (National Public Radio broadcast, "All Things Considered," Nov. 2, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script
File.
Not surprisingly, attorneys for employers groups were disappointed with the McKennon decision, while civil rights
attorneys were relieved. Supreme Court Issues Two Important Decisions, supra note 1. The reactions of others were more
mixed. Judith Flickman, Women's Legal Defense Fund Director, characterized the decision as "a very bad win," since
"victims of discrimination will now be allowed to pursue the [legal] remedies and rights without fear that employers are
going to just go on fishing expeditions." Id. Laurence Gold, AFL-CIO General Counsel, stated "it's not clear who won
the war,' although the "'employee did not win on the issue of remedies."' Attorney Finds Supreme Court More Pro-
Employee than Appeals Courts, DAILY LAB. REP., March 16, 1995 (statement by Laurence Gold at the District of
Columbia Bar's annual program on the Supreme Court's labor and employment docket).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Star. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
to e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
25. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429 (1971)).
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
Retaliatory discharge is also prohibited in § 704:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment.., because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter ....
1995]
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Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered from employment discrimination.26
A private individual who files an individual claim acts as "a private attorney general" to
advance the societal interest in enforcement. 27 Because the ADEA shares with Title VII
the purpose of eradicating discrimination in the work place" by prohibiting the "arbitrary
age discrimination in employment," 2 and since the ADEA prohibitions "were derived in
haec verba from Title VII," examination of Title VII cases is appropriate when
interpreting the ADEA provisions."°
Three classes of disparate treatment claims have evolved under Title VII: pure
discrimination, pretext, and mixed motives.3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green32
introduced an analytical model of the shifting burdens of proof in the first two classes.
The Court later refined this model in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine33 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.34 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,35 as
modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act"), 36 governs claims based on the
theory of mixed motives-the allegation that both legitimate and illegitimate motives
were present at the time of an employment decision. Both the McDonnell Douglas
framework and the Price Waterhouse theory of mixed motives significantly affect the
legal premise upon which the after-acquired evidence doctrine was founded. Thus, a brief
discussion of their mechanics, underlying policies, and judicial and legislative
modifications will provide the procedural context in which to examine the after-acquired
evidence doctrine.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
In cases of employment discrimination, plaintiffs often lack direct evidence to prove
an unlawful motive; rather, they must rely on circumstantial evidence from which courts
may infer discriminatory intent. 37 The McDonnell Douglas framework originally
developed standards for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination
based on circumstantial evidence in hiring and promotion decisions. Courts subsequently
Id. § 2000e-3(a).
26. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
27. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968) (per curiam).
28. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 584 (1978); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrim'inatlion in Ernploynen Act. Titde
VII. and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts anda Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNEL. REv. 1093, 1096-97 (1993)
(noting the similarity of statutory language and the joint doctrinal evolution of Title VII and the ADEA).
29.29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id. § 623(a)(1).
30. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584; see also Whitten v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Kan. 1991). The
remedial provisions differ between the two acts and will be considered separately. See infra notes 178-87 and
accompanying text.
31. While "disparate treatment" is one theory of liability, a second theory of liability under Title VII is "disparate
impact." Proof of discriminatory motive is not required, for this theory involves "practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Although this Note
focuses primarily on disparate treatment claims, the issue of after-acquired evidence can arise under a theory of disparate
impact. The ramifications are addressed infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
32.411 U.S. 792 (1973).
33. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
34. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
35. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality).
36. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1993)). The Act's
effect on Price Waterhouse is addressed infra notes 52-56, 118 and accompanying text.
37. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54.
[Vol. 71:235
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adapted this framework for discharge cases" and also applied it to analogous claims
under the ADEA 9 A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing (1) that the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) that she applied and was qualified for a vacant
position; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that, after her
rejection, the position remained vacant and the employer continued to seek applicants
with qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff.4 A prima facie case creates an initial
inference of discriminatory discharge or failure to hire and shifts the burden to the
employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the termination. 4'
The employer need not prove that this proffered reason actually motivated the
employment decision; it must only produce evidence that supports an inference of lawful
motivation. 42 The plaintiff retains the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence
that the true reason was intentional discrimination.
43
B. The Mixed-Motives Analysis of Mt. Healthy and
Price Waterhouse
The McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable in the context of mixed motives,
for "[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives.., it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was 'the "true
reason"' for the decision. . .. -44 Consequently, Price Waterhouse sets forth a separate
38. MAcK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.44 (1987).
39. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701,1707(1993); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111
(1985); see also LEE M. MODESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (listing recent
federal court cases); Eglit, supra note 28, at 1097.
40. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
41. Id.
42. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 254; see generally PLAYER, supra note 38,
§ 5.44, at 393-95.
43. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) (requiring plaintiffs in pretext cases to show that
an employer's proffered legitimate reason for an employment decision was pretextual and that the actual reason was
discriminatory). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework prior to Hicks, to prove a discriminatory motive a plaintiff
needed only to prove that an employer's explanation was pretextual. Hicks' recent refinement--or, more properly,
revision-of the McDonnell Douglas scheme has been the source of widespread controversy, prompting a bill proposed
by the Senate to restore the burdens of proof as they were prior to Hicks. S. 1776, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993). The
requirement that a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment prove a discriminatory motive in addition to proving pretext is
an undue burden on the plaintiff and a contravention of McDonnell Douglas' purpose to provide a means of proving
discrimination absent direct evidence. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2756-66 (Souter, J., dissenting); Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the PllaintrffLoses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 57 (1991).
This additional procedural obstacle of proving discrinminatory motive for victims of discrimination seeking redress may
discourage these victims from pursuing valid claims. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (anticipating that
the burdens and uncertainties of the majority's scheme will chill Title VII litigation and frustrate the legislative purpose
of the Act); see generally Jody H. Odell, Comment, Between Pretext Only andPretext Plus: Understanding St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks andIts Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251 (1994). This potential
effect raises questions as to the Court's perception of the need for antidiscrimination enforcement. See Minna J. Kotkin,
Public Remediesfor Private Wrongs: Rethinking the 27tle VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1301, 1310 (1990)
(explaining the 1988 term as the result of a "Supreme Court that is apparently intent upon substantively narrowing
protections against discrimination"); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act o1)991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of
the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 924 (1993) (recalling eight weeks
in 1989 during which the Supreme Court handed down seven decisions interpreting civil rights statutes in ways restrictive
to plaintiffs).
44. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989) (emphasis in original) (citing Petitioner's brief). For
several different descriptions of the "mixed-motive" case, see Lisa Sivley, Note, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: The
"Same-Decision" Test Adopledfor "Mixed-Motive" Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 28 HOUS.
L. REV. 413,414 (1991).
1995]
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standard to govern this class of Title VII claims. A complainant has the burden of
producing evidence that an unlawful factor played a motivating part in an employment
decision.4" With the burden thereby shifted to the employer, the employer may avoid
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision absent the impermissible motive.46 This standard was derived from a
principle articulated over a decade earlier in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle,47 which directed that "an employee [be] placed in no worse a
position" than had no unlawful conduct occurred.
4
1
Price Waterhouse adapted the Mt. Healthy standard to Title VII cases, in particular, to
a sex discrimination claim brought by a female partnership candidate in an accounting
firm. Price Waterhouse argued that even absent considerations of gender it would have
refused to make the candidate a partner because of her interpersonal skills.49 The Court
stressed two components of the employer's burden of proving that it would have made
the "same decision" for this legitimate reason."0 First, objective evidence must show that
the legitimate reason would have itself justified the termination. Second, the employer
cannot prevail if the proffered lawful reason was not a motivating factor "at the time of
the decision."'"
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has since repudiated the aspect of Price Waterhouse
which barred recovery for a proven discriminatory motive if the same employment
decision would have been reached absent any illegal animus. Instead, it provides recovery
if the complainant demonstrates that an impermissible motive was "a motivating factor
... even though other factors also motivated the practice."52 The 1991 Act retains the
"same decision" standard but limits its relevance to the determination of the appropriate
remedy for employment discrimination. 3
Congress passed the 1991 Act to eliminate the "inevitable effect of the Price
Waterhouse decision ... to permit prohibited employment discrimination to escape
sanction under Title VII."54 As Congress underscored:
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-45.
46. Id. at 258.
47.429 U.S. 274 (1977).
48. Id. at 285-86. Mi. Healthy involved a constitutional tort claim brought by an untenured teacher who was not
rehired in part for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment. The school board provided two reasons for its
decision not to renew his contract: (1) the teacher disclosed the contents of an internal memorandum regarding a possible
faculty dress code to a radio station which subsequently aired the news; and (2) the teacher made obscene gestures to
female students. Id at 282-83. Although the first proffered reason involved protected conduct, the Supreme Court held
that remedial action was unwarranted if the school board would have discharged the teacher for the obscene gestures,
regardless of the radio station incident. Id. at 285. Even if the protected conduct played a "substantial part" in the
employment decision, no constitutional violation would have occurred. Id. The Court explained: "The constitutional
principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged
in the conduct." Id. at 285-86.
49. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233-35.
50. Id. at 244-45. This "same decision" test is a rebuttal to the employee's demonstration of the presence of an
impermissible motive. Also referred to as the "harmless error" doctrine, Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in
the Mixed-Motive Title VllAction: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292.293 (1982), it involves an inquiry
into "but for" causation. A successful rebuttal constitutes, in effect, an affirmative defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
at 246.
51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added). "The very premise of a mixed-motives case is that a
legitimate reason was present." Id This immediate temporal requirement is an important point of departure in the context
of after-acquired evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19 and sources cited therein.
52.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).
53. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586
(explaining § 203 of the new legislation).
54. Id. at 46, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 584.
[Vol. 71:235
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If Title VII's ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, victims of
proven discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of discrimination
must be held liable for their actions.... Legislation is needed to restore Title VII's
comprehensive ban on all impermissible considerations of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin in employment. 5
The adverse congressional response to Price Waterhouse is significant 6 and particularly
relevant in evaluating the after-acquired evidence doctrine operating in the context of
federal statutory law.
II. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF AFTER-
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE: A FRAGMENTED
CIRCUIT
The after-acquired evidence doctrine emerged in 1988 as a complete defense in the
Tenth Circuit's seminal decision of Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co." It was later adopted by Courts of Appeals in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits." The
Eleventh Circuit, in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,' 9 expressly rejected the Summers
per se rule and limited the use of after-acquired evidence to the remedies stage of
litigation.6 0 The Third Circuit joined the Wallace camp,6 while the Second and Ninth
Circuits never squarely addressed the issue but indicated an alliance with the Eleventh
Circuit's position.6 2 The Seventh Circuit neither embraced nor rejected the Summers rule.
Instead, it produced a trail of decisions fraught with inconsistencies and an approach
which is uncertain at best.6
55. Id. at 47, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585 (emphasis in original).
56. Congress also reacted adversely to Hicks. Although only Price Waterhouse was legislatively modified, Price
Waterhouse was more offensive to the principles of Title VII in its tolerance of discrimination, while Hicks arguably only
added to the plaintiff's burden of proof. The congressional and scholarly reactions to Hicks are summarized supra note
43.
57. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995).
58. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d
409 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, the Tenth Circuit itself cited decisions rendered by District of Columbia and Fourth Circuit
Courts of Appeals which approved the use of after-the-fact rationales in failure-to-hire claims. Summers, 864 F.2d at 706-
07. The District of Columbia Circuit approved as a valid defense an alternative holding that the applicant "wouldn't have
been hired anyway" because he was not qualified for flight office. Id. at 707 (citing with approval Murnane v. American
Airlines, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ADEA claim), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982)). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
approved the defense that the applicant would not have been hired absent his age since he was previously discharged by
another airline under disfavorable circumstances, a fact unknown by the defendant at the time it rejected the application.
Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
59. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'gNo. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL 423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991)
(aff'd hl part and rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11 th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1Ith Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 1181.
61. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995); Massey v.
Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1993).
62. Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctra. Corp., 43 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1994) (expressing doubt as to the validity of an after-
acquired rationale as a defense to liability given its inconsistency with Title VII goals); EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31
F.3d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that, although employer failed to preserve the after-acquired evidence defense on
appeal, "it would be inequitable to hold that after-acquired evidence of misrepresentations in a job application should
preclude an otherwise successful plaintiff from recovering damages"); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or.
1994) (opining that the Ninth Circuit would reject the Summers rule and refusing to limit the remedy because of after-
acquired evidence proven immaterial by the employee's satisfactory job performance over the course of 22 years).
63. See infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
1995]
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A. After-Acquired Evidence as a Complete Defense:
The Summers Rule
The Tenth Circuit promulgated the after-acquired evidence doctrine in a case of
repeated instances of employee misconduct. Summers, a field claims representative,
maintained a satisfactory work record during his first seven years of employment with
State Farm. State Farm discovered in 1980, however, that Summers had previously
falsified a document, whereupon it warned him that it could terminate him if he made
more falsifications."' Instead, when State Farm uncovered another falsified record and
numerous other "suspicious" claims, it placed Summers on probationary status for two
weeks without pay.6" Summers returned to work and was discharged in 1982, allegedly
for his poor attitude."
Summers subsequently filed age and religious discrimination claims under the ADEA
and Title VII, respectively." In preparation for trial, State Farm examined all documents
prepared by Summers and discovered more than 150 falsified records, eighteen of which
Summers prepared after his return from probation. As a result of this discovery, State
Farm moved for summary judgment stating that, since it would have fired Summers had
it known of his misconduct, Summers was entitled to no remedy." The Tenth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment by relying upon and extending the rationale established in
Mt. Healthy.69
Summers, decided before Price Waterhouse, pushed the Mt. Healthy principle one step
further by importing an additional, hypothetical factor into an already hypothetical
inquiry: whether the employer would have made the same employment decision if the
later discovered, lawful reason had been present at the time of discharge. Recognizing
that the evidence of misconduct acquired four years after Summers' termination was not
the cause of the discharge, the court assumed for purposes of summary judgment that
State Farm's action was discriminatorily motivated.7' However, the court maintained that
the after-acquired evidence "[wa]s relevant to Summers' claim of 'injury,'and dfid] itself
preclude the grant of any present relief or remedy to Summers."' It reasoned that
Summers suffered no injury since previous misconduct justified his discharge, and a grant
of relief would therefore place him in a better position than had State Farm not engaged
in discrimination. 2 The court punctuated its reasoning with the since oft-quoted
hypothetical:
To argue, as Summers does, that this after-acquired evidence should be ignored is
utterly unrealistic. The present case is akin to the hypothetical wherein a company
64. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 702 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 702-03.
67. Id. at 702.
68. Id. at 704.
69. Id. at 705-06.
70. Id. at 708.
71. Id. Although the court recognized a general reluctance to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination
cases, it stated that the "obvious cases should be weeded out before trial." Id. at 709. This conclusory statement was later
replaced by the materiality standard. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992)
(requiring that after-acquired evidence must establish "valid and legitimate reasons" for the discharge). The employer's
burden of proof is discussed infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
72. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708; cf Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
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doctor is fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the company, in defending
a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged employee was not a
"doctor." In our view, the masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and
Summers is in no better position.
73
This image of an unscrupulous employee perhaps made it easier for the court to deny
antidiscrimination remedies traditionally perceived to be due to victims, not victimizers.
In Summers, the description may have been easy to ascribe, given the 150 instances of
falsification. As courts following Summers realized, however, not all employees can be
accurately characterized so negatively. Accordingly, modifications of the Summers rule
focused on standards ensuring that employers did not manipulate to their undeserved
advantage the stereotype of deceitful employees.
The employer's burden of proof is measured by standards of "would not have hired"
or "would have fired" for claims of failure to hire and wrongful discharge, respectively.74
The sufficiency of proof differs under these two standards. For example, an employer is
unlikely to hire an applicant who lied on her rdsumd or employment application. The
misrepresentations may expose an unqualified candidate, or at the least "demonstraten
a pattern of dishonesty and disregard for the truth."" Once an employer hires an applicant
and invests training in her, however, an employer may be less likely to terminate and seek
a replacement for an employee who has proven herself to be quite capable in the
position.' Accordingly, some courts applied the "would have fired" standard to discharge
cases involving rdsum fraud and employee misconduct."7
The Sixth Circuit required elements of proof to satisfy this version of the "same
decision" standard." In defense of a wrongful termination claim, the after-acquired
evidence must establish "valid and legitimate reasons" for the discharge." In an instance
of application or rdsumd fraud, the misrepresentation or omission must be "material,
directly related to measuring a candidate for employment, and ... relied upon by the
employer in making the hiring decision." 0
A showing that the employment decision would have been justified, that is, the
employer could have fired or not hired the individual, is insufficient to invoke the
73. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
74. See Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250,255 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Generalizing, the hypothetical inquiry
should correspond to the time of the allegedly discriminatory employment decision."). Summers refused to distinguish
between claims of failure tW hire and of wrongful discharge. Concerned with fashioning an appropriate remedy instead
of detennining the cause of termination, the court did not find a meaningful distinction between application-rejection and
discharge. Summers, 864 F.2d at 707 n.3. For a listing of courts' application of "would have hired" and "would not have
hired" standards, see Washington, 969 F.2d at 254 n.3.
75. O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
76. Washington, 969 F.2d at 254; Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (D. Colo. 1992);
James G. Babb, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence As a Defense in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 30
Hous. L. REv. 1945, 1957-58 (1994) (summarizing Bonger); cf. Smith v. General Scanning, 876 F.2d 1315, 1320 (7th
Cir. 1989) (stating that in the MDonnellDouglas burden-shifting analysis, the "more appropriate' inquiry" in discharge
cases "is job performance, into which the question of qualifications merges" (citing Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448,
452 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988)).
77. See Bonger, 789 F. Supp. at 1106 (applying the "would have fired" standard since an employer may not
necessarily terminate an employee if application fraud was discovered after hiring).
78. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992).
79.Id
80. Id (finding employee's numerous misrepresentations on her application, including a false claim of a college
degree when the employer expressly required one, established materiality and reliance); see Churchman v. Pinkerton's,
Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 520 (D. Kan. 1991).
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defense."' Disagreement exists as to the sufficiency of admonitory language printed on
the employment application stating that misrepresentations would result in termination.12
In contrast, an employer may be unable to prevail on a motion for summary judgment if
its sole supporting evidence is its conclusory statement that the employee's misconduct
would have resulted in the same employment decision: "[b]y itself, [the] affidavit is a
self-serving document and does not establish the material fact that [the employer] would
not have hired [the employee] but for the misrepresentation." 3
The requirement of materiality -and reliance prevents employers from engaging in
"fishing expedition[s]" 4 into employee conduct and records to uncover trivial
misrepresentations as a means to avoid liability, for a discriminatory discharge. 5
However, these burdens will not prevent fishing expeditions to discover nontrivial
information. The limitation of such a preventative measure belies any claim that the per
se rule will not create perverse incentives for employers. This policy concern, as well as
competing legal analyses, prompted other circuits to reject the Summers treatment of
after-acquired evidence-altogether.
B. The Remedy-Specific Use of After-Acquired
Evidence
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Summers doctrine in Wallace v. Dunn Construction
Co." and held after-acquired evidence to be relevant only in the remedial phase of the
suit. 7 The court criticized Summers as inconsistent with the mixed-motive analysis and
with the primary objective of Title VII.s First, it reasoned that the Tenth Circuit
misinterpreted Mt. Healthy by ignoring the lapse of time between the employment
81. Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodserv. Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding company policy that employees are
subject to discharge for application fraud is insufficient); cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989)
(stating that in a mixed-motives case, the employer must show that the same decision would have been made based on
the legitimate reason standing alone). But see O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1994) (granting
summay judgment where employer showed employee's termination was justified, and plaintiff failed to produce evidence
that employer would not have fired her), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
82. Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994). The employment application stated that "any
misstatement or omission of fact on this application shall be considered cause for dismissal," id at 1404, but the court
required more substantial evidence that the warning reflected actual company policy: "Mhe employer bears a substantial
burden of establishing that the policy pre-dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question and that the policy
constitutes more than the mere contract or employment application boilerplate." Id. at 1406; accord Washington v. Lake
County, 969 F.2d 250, 257 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that language, "may," in dismissal clause is not dispositive). For
a related but weaker test, see O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 180 (making no inquiry into materiality since the language in the
employment application, coupled with severity and number of misrepresentations justified her termination and plaintiff
failed to produce evidence that employer would not have done so); Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414 (holding that an admonitory
warning in the employment application, nature and number of misrepresentations, and company's express requirement
of college degree was sufficient).
83. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1406 (refusing to grant summary judgment to an employer when its affidavit was the only
proffered evidence to support claim that employee would not have been hired for failing to disclose prior employment).
Contra O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 176 (holding that waming on application and employer's affidavit shifted burden to
employee to produce evidence of disparate treatment of other employees-for misconduct equivalent to her own);
Washington, 969 F.2d at 256-57 (holding that employee has burden to produce affirmative evidence rebutting employer's
uncontradicted affidavits).
84. Washington, 969 F.2d at 256.
85. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414.
86. 968 F.2d 1174 ( lth Cir. 1992), rev'gNo. CIVA.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL 423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991)
(affd in part and rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1lth Cir. 1994).
87. Id at 1181.
88. Id at 1180.
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decision and the discovery of a legitimate reason for the action." Excusing liability for
a motive not present at the time of discharge, and indeed often discovered as a result of
a discriminatory act itself, contravened the Mt. Healthy principle that a plaintiff be placed
"in no worse a position than if she had not been a member of a protected class."" Second,
considering the perverse incentives created by a complete defense approach,9' the
Wallace court determined that the Summers rule subverted the primary purpose of Title
VII to create incentives for employers to eradicate employment discrimination.'
Consequently, the court concluded that after-acquired evidence had no bearing on the
question of liability.
The Eleventh Circuit did not disregard after-acquired evidence entirely, however.
While irrelevant to the question of liability, the court held that evidence of employee
fraud or misconduct was relevant to the remedies afforded a successful plaintiff. This
approach seeks to balance "the preservation of the employer's lawful prerogatives and
the restoration of the discrimination victim," a balance advocated by Title VII itself.'
Wallace Construction reasoned that the imposition of these prospective remedies would
go beyond making the victim whole and would impair an employer's freedom to make
lawful employment decisions.9" Therefore, if after-acquired evidence provides a
legitimate reason for termination, relief such as reinstatement, front pay, and injunction
are unavailable to a successful plaintiff." On the other hand, an award of
backpay-calculated to the point at which an employer proves it would have legitimately
discovered the evidence-provides a make-whole remedy to a victim of discrimination
without denying employer prerogatives.96
C. Confusion in the Seventh Circuit
Although the Seventh Circuit's position is unclear, its most recent decision, at least in
its outcome, is most comparable to the Eleventh Circuit's approach in Wallace.97 The
circuit first addressed the issue of after-acquired evidence in Smith v. General Scanning,
Inc.,91 a case of application fraud. Smith rejected the Summers doctrine, holding that the
embellished educational credentials discovered during litigation under the ADEA were
irrelevant to the issue of lawful termination." The court did suggest in dicta that the later
discovered fraud may be "highly relevant" in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 1°
89. Id. at 1179. The factual premise of mixed-motive cases-the presence of legitimate and illegitimate factors at
the time of the employment decision--renders its analysis inapplicable to after-acquired evidence cases where the
legitimate motive by definition was not present at the moment in question. Id at 1180-81.
90. Id at 1179 (citing M. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86).
9 1. See ifia notes 120-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the perverse incentives created by the Summers
doctrine.
92. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180.
93.Id at 1181.
94. Id at 1182; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973) (noting that Title VII does not
vitiate lawful employment decisionmaking. "Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has
engaged in... deliberate, unlawful activity against it."); cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,242-43 (1989)
(noting that allowing the employer to avoid liability by showing the same decision would have been made absent a
discriminatory motive preserves Title VII's balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives).
95. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1184.
96. Id at 1182. For a detailed discussion of backpay calculation, see infra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
97. Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodserv. Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993), reh g and reh g en banc denied, No. 91-
3487, 91-3552, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9919 (7th Cir. Apr. 29, 1993).
98. 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1319.
100. Id at 1319 n.2.
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The Court's next encounter with after-acquired evidence yielded a different analysis,
however. In Gilty v. Village of Oak Park,'0 ' it granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, reasoning that a police officer who had misrepresented his educational
background failed to meet the "quasi-standing elements" of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case; that is, Gilty was not a "qualified" employee. 0 2 Applying an objective
standard to determine that Gilty was unqualified, the court relied not upon his lack of
academic credentials, but upon his lack of honesty. 3 Similar to the Summers approach,
and contrary to the approach articulated in Smith,"'4 this objective standard ignored the
fact that his character trait was unknown to those evaluating candidates for promotion and
could not have been an influencing factor in the decision.' 5 Finally, even if Gilty could
have established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, his claim would have failed
for lack of injury."'" Again, the perceived negation of injury by after-acquired evidence
parallels the reasoning in Summers. Two years later, the Seventh Circuit retreated from
its alignment with the Tenth Circuit by concentrating on the employer's burden of
proof"'7 and by explicitly adopting the "would have fired" standard in instances of rdsum6
fraud."'' Without adopting the reasoning of Summers, the court applied the Price
Waterhouse evidentiary framework and held in Washington v. Lake County that a
defendant employer was entitled to summary judgment if it would have fired the
employee upon discovery of the application fraud."' 9
The Seventh Circuit's most recent decision of Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice
Co."° only added to its confusing and inconsistent treatment of after-acquired evidence.
Citing its initial position in Smith, the court advanced a position that closely paralleled
the remedy-specific approach of Wallace. Addressing the retaliatory discharge claim in
Kristufek, the court reasoned that after-acquired evidence did not alter the deterring
statutory penalty for retaliation because the issue concerned the circumstances known at
the time of discharge."' Pursuant to Smith dicta, the court considered the later discovered
rdsumd falsification in determining damages, but it declined to deny all relief on a
101.919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
102. Id. at 1251. The officer claimed that his promotion denial was racially motivated. His employer subsequently
discovered that Gilty had enhanced his academic credentials, whereupon Gilty was terminated. Gilty then amended his
complaint to include retaliatory discharge. Id. at 1248-50.
103. Id at 1251. Tlhis argument involving the prima facie case is discussed infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
104. Nowhere in the Gilty opinion is Smith distinguished or even mentioned.
105. Gily, 919 F.2d at 1251 ("[Ain employer's knowledge or lack of knowledge is of no relevance at the prima facie
stage of the case.").
106. Id at 1253. Even absent the purported disparate treatment, Gilty would not have been among the two candidates
selected for promotion. Id at 1252. Significantly, the court equated an employment discrimination claim and a tort: "As
in any tort case, statutory or otherwise, a plaintiff cannot win a discrimination case if the harm to him would have been
the same whether or not the defendant had discriminated." Id. at 1253. For a complete discussion of the historical
developments leading to the view espoused in Gilty but urging adoption of an approach similar to tVallace, see Cheryl K.
Zemelman, The After-A cquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1993).
107. Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Reed was distinguishable from Summers
by the fact that the employer, although it could have fired the plaintiff for application fraud, never proved that it would
have done so. Id. at 1298. The question of fact as to the materiality of the misconduct rendered the district court's grant
of summary judgment based on Summers erroneous. See id. Summary judgment was nevertheless affirmed since the
plaintiff-employee in Reed failed to establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie el ment of disparate treatment. Id
108. Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
109. Id. The court imposed upon an employer a preponderance of the evidence standard in proving that the same
decision would have been made. Id. at 255.
110.985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
1l1. Seeid. at 369.
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Summers rationale since the two cases were factually distinguishable.' 2 Instead, the court
.reduced the judgment by the amount of backpay accumulating after the employer
discovered the fraud so as not to penalize the employer."' While the court did not dismiss
the possibility that all relief could be denied in other circumstances, the academic
qualifications that Kristufek claimed to possess "were not so critical as to cancel out the
statutory penalty for a discriminatory firing.""
' 4
The Seventh Circuit adopted neither the complete defense nor the remedy-specific
approach. Instead, it treated after-acquired evidence on a truly case-by-case basis, thereby
producing an enigmatic chain of decisions and carving a middle ground between
Summers and Wallace. The threshold requirement of qualification under McDonnell
Douglas seems to have been subsumed within the "would have fired" standard imposed
on employers. There was a potential bar to all relief if the severity of the
misrepresentation outweighed the deterrent goals of antidiscrimination law, a highly
subjective and unpredictable analysis. Also, the circuit adhered to the date of actual
discovery as the terminating point of the recoverable backpay period.' Otherwise, recent
Seventh Circuit jurisprudence followed the Wallace approach.
Perhaps the uncertainty within the Seventh Circuit best illustrates the entanglement of
policy concerns and factual permutations in complete defense claims. The infusion of
evidence of an employee's own wrongdoing into the already complex and emotionally
charged context of employment discrimination blurs the traditional notions of victim and
victimizer, those to be deterred and those deserving remedial relief. The adverse reaction
to, employee misconduct diverted attention away from the aim of antidiscrimination
statutes in jurisdictions which treated after-acquired evidence as a complete bar to
liability. The Supreme Court has recently restored focus in employment discrimination
litigation. However, the remedy-specific approach enunciated in McKennon, particularly
with respect to backpay, is internally inconsistent and may perpetuate the fragmented
approach among the lower courts in fashioning appropriate remedies authorized by the
numerous federal statutory schemes.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Invalidity of the Complete Defense Approach
Striking down the complete defense approach to after-acquired evidence, the Supreme
Court in McKennon refuted the analogy to mixed-motives which formed the central
premise of Summers. The Tenth Circuit constructed the Summers per se rule upon an
unjustifiable extension of Mt. Healthy to incongruous factual situations. By disregarding
the lapse of time between the time of the employment decision and the time at which the
112. Kristufek's single falsification was not discovered prior to termination. The degrees he claimed to possess were
not prerequisites for the job, and he functioned well without them. Id at 369-70. Summers, on the other hand, falsified
multiple documents, conduct which affected his job performance. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
113. Kfishufek, 985 F.2d at 371. The court did not consider in Washington v. Lake County whether the plaintiffwas
entitled to backpay for the period of time between the discharge and the discovery of misconduct since the plaintiff did
not raise the argument. Washington, 969 F.2d at 253 n.2.
114. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 370. Kristufek, hired as Director of Employee and Community Relations, stated he had
a bachelor's degree from Drake University and had taken graduate courses at Northwestern University. In fact, he had
attended but never graduated from Drake, and he had taken courses at Northwestern, but not at the graduate level. I'd at
366.
115. An alternative calculation ofthe recoverable backpay period is explicated infra text accompanying notes 215-19.
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employer possessed a legitimate reason for that decision, the per se approach places the
employee in a worse position than if no discrimination had occurred. Furthermore, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 destroyed any legal support provided by Price Waterhouse.
Finally, the Summers approach to after-acquired evidence contravenes the purpose of
federal antidiscrimination laws by denying remedies to victims of discrimination and by
failing to deter those employers who have engaged in the unlawful conduct these statutes
seek to eradicate.
1. The Flawed and Refuted Foundation of the Mixed-
Motives Analogy
a. The Inapplicability of Mixed-Motives Analysis
Summers purports to effectuate the Mt. Healthy principle of placing a victim of
discrimination in the same position in which she would have been absent any
impermissible motivating factor by applying the "same decision" test. However, allowing
employers to consider information learned after the allegedly discriminatory act to prove
that the same decision would have been made contravenes the very principle which
justified the Summers rule. Claims of mixed-motives assume the presence of both
legitimate and illegitimate factors motivating the employer at the time of the employment
decision." 6 As its name underscores, however, after-acquired evidence played no role in
the employment decision, often assumed to be discriminatorily motivated for purposes
of summary judgment."" The difficulty that controlled the Mt. Healthy
decision-determining an employer's decisionmaking motive-is not present in cases of
after-acquired evidence. This distinction renders Mt. Healthy inapplicable."8 Refuting the
legal premise of Summers, the McKennon Court clearly narrowed the inquiry in the
liability phase of discrimination claims to employer, not employee, conduct. "Mixed
motive cases are inapposite [in after-acquired evidence cases], except to the important
extent they underscore the necessity of determining the employer's motives in ordering
the discharge, an essential element in determining whether the employer violated the
federal antidiscrimination law.""' 9
116. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
118. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995). In addition to resting on
misinterpreted precedent, the Summers rule does not survive the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988
& Supp. V 1993). For a comprehensive discussion of the modifications of and implications for the ADEA of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, see Eglit, supra note 28. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to expand the scope of civil
rights statutes and to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3(1), (4), 105 Stat.
1071 (1991); see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The 1991 Act entitles victims of discriminatory employment
practices to relief upon a showing that an illegal animus was "a motivating factor" in the adverse employment decision,
even if not a but-for or substantial factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The
Proper Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REv. 49, 78 (1993). This
statute put the "same position" rationale of M. Healthy into question and invalidated any reliance by after-acquired
evidence courts upon the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analogy. If remedial action is appropriate where an unlawful
motive was merely present but was not necessarily a substantial motivating factor in an employment decision, relief is
certainly appropriate where an illegal animus was the sole reason, as in most claims of after-acquired evidence. Therefore,
allowing after-acquired evidence to bar all liability also violates the congressional mandate of the 1991 amendment.
119. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
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b. Creating Perverse Incentives
The Summers per se rule also contravenes the deterrent purpose of Title VII, a purpose
which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reaffirmed.' Indeed, the Court recognized that the
concern of many commentators and courts that the after-acquired evidence doctrine
creates perverse incentives for employers was "not an insubstantial one."'2' Prior to its
invalidation, practitioners were advised to implement procedures that maximized the
availability of the after-acquired evidence defense.' " For example, in a complete defense
jurisdiction, crafting employment applications "to elicit even more specific
information"' would have provided useful evidence in the event of litigation, as would
contacting educational institutions, previous employers, physical and mental health care
professionals, and acquiring court files. 24 As a consequence, potential plaintiffs would
have been discouraged from bringing discrimination claims, whether or not they have
committed any wrong, if their closets contained any skeletons.'" The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that Summers "invite[d] employers to establish ludicrously low thresholds for
'legitimate' termination and to devote fewer resources to preventing discrimination"
since they could "manufactur[e] a 'legitimate' reason for the discharge that fit[] the flaws
in the employee's background."'' 26 Also created is the incentive to "sandbag."' 27
The treatment of after-acquired evidence as a complete bar to liability is inconsistent
with the deterrent goal of federal antidiscrimination statutes. Indeed, not only did the
Summers approach fail to deter against discrimination in the workplace, it encouraged
unlawful employment practices.12 ' As the McKennon Court held, the complete defense
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Congress found that "additional remedies under federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the work place." § 2(1), 105 Stat. at 1071.
121. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887.
122. Mesritz, supra note 16, at 215.
123.Id
124. Id. at 222-23; see also James A. Burstein & Steven L. Hamann, Better Late Than Never-After-Acquired
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. Li. 193 (1993); Robert M. Shea, Postitermination
Discovery of Employee Misconduct: A New Defense in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. Li.
103 (1991).
125. The prospect of a defendant's thorough inquiry into the details of a plaintiff's pre- and post-hiring conduct,
however, may chill the enthusiasm and frequency with which employment discrimination claims are pursued, even in cases
where the victim of discrimination has nothing to hide, let alone cases where the potential plaintiff is not entirely
blameless. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995); see
also Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Or. 1994); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F.
Supp. 314,323 (D.NJ. 1993); Douglas L. Williams & Julia A. Davis, Title VII Update-Skeletons anda Double-Edged
Sword, C669 A.L.L-A.BA. 305 (1991); Samuel A. Mills, Towardan Equitable After-AcquiredEvidence Rule, 94 COLUM.
L.REV. 1525, 1531 (1994).
126. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F2d 1174,1180 (1lth Cir. 1992), rev'gNo. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL
423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (ard in part and rev 'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (1lth Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
(1lth Cir. 1994). Some employers argue that omissions or misrepresentations on job applications are always relevant in
their reflection upon the applicant's honesty. Schmidt, 864 F. Supp. at 995. However, the relation between the omission,
the job description, and the length of the employment tenure during which an employer can observe the employee's
honesty may preclude any showing of materiality and reliance. Id
127. Sandbagging occurs when an employer hires someone despite a known, legitimate reason that the applicant
should be rejected, conceals evidence of that knowledge, freely discriminates (for example, harassment or wage
discrimination) until the employee objects, and then "discovers" the legitimate reason during litigation if need be. Wallace,
968 F.2d at 1180-81. One court suggests that the practice of sandbagging could itself violate Title VII and the ADEA, and
the evidence thereby obtained would be inadmissible even in the remedies stage of litigation. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1238
n.31 (dictum).
128. Cf. Brodin, supra note 50, at 318 (criticizing the lack of deterrent effect created by the M. Healthy "same
decision" test: "Indeed, the refusal of the courts to take some action against such 'harmless' discrimination might actually
encourage the continuation of such conduct." (emphasis in original)).
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approach therefore fails on policy grounds, for antidiscrimination objectives are undercut
by a doctrine that permits, and even encourages, an employer to escape sanction for
discriminatory, statutorily prohibited practices:
The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee establishes that
an employer has discriminated against him or her. The disclosure through litigation of
incidents or practices which violate national policies respecting nondiscrimination in
the work force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns
of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the Act's operation or entrenched
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance. The
efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one measure of the success of the
Act. 2
9
2. The Failure of Subsidiary Arguments Under Summers
As alternatives to the mixed-motives reasoning of Summers, advocates of the complete
defense approach advanced two arguments to justify the denial of relief to employees
later discovered to have engaged in fraud or misconduct. The first argument is procedural
and incorporates the Summers rationale: since the employee's own conduct would have
resulted in the same adverse employment decision, the employee has suffered no legal
injury, or is not qualified, and therefore lacks standing to pursue a claim. The second
argument rests upon the equitable doctrine of "clean hands," a doctrine both addressed
and dismissed in McKennon.130 Both arguments misperceive the nature of the injury
resulting from discrimination, and they ultimately fail under the language and purpose
of federal antidiscrimination law.
a. Standing & "Injury"
Lack of standing has barred claims involving after-acquired evidence in some courts,
although upon two different theories. The first of these is founded upon the "qualified"
element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. The employee is not qualified for
the position for which she was hired, as evidenced by the material omissions or
misrepresentation of her employment application. Consequently, she cannot establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination and therefore lacks standing.' The
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case creates an inference of discriminatory intent since
proof of an employer's state of mind is virtually impossible absent direct evidence.
3 2
Nevertheless, an employee is not confined to the prima facie case; the inference can also
be created by other types of circumstantial evidence.' For instance, in after-acquired
evidence cases, courts assume when considering a motion for summary judgment that the
employer acted with discriminatory intent. "Thus, the four-prong McDonnell-Douglas
test, used to establish a prima facie case, and designed to ferret out intentional
discrimination, has no role to play."' 34 Even the Summers court recognized the
129. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
130.Id
131. Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that omission of health and
employment history rendered plaintiff not qualified for the postal job and not entitled to discrimination relieo; Gilty v.
Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
132. See Lanetot, supra note 43, at 66.
133. White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 63.
134. Id. at 64.
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inapplicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework since the scheme "clearly
presupposes a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory reason' known to the employer at the time
of the employee's discharge."1"
Demonstrating that an employee is qualified for the position eliminates the most logical
reason for a legitimate adverse employment action. 3 6 The purpose of the "qualified"
element of the prima facie case is to enable a plaintiff to raise the inference of
discrimination, not for its objective truth. An argument to the contrary leads to illogical
and unjust results. For instance, suppose an employer received the rdsumds of two
applicants bearing the same name, only one of which reflected the necessary college
degree to deem her qualified for the available position. However, the unqualified
applicant was mistakenly hired, performed satisfactorily for several years, and was
eventually fired for allegedly discriminatory reasons. Under the reasoning of courts
applying McDonnell Douglas, the employee could not establish standing since she lacked
the requisite degree to be "qualified." Certainly the prima facie element is not intended
to prevent this type of discrimination claim.
Furthermore, the focus in McDonnell Douglas is on the employer's intent, which can
only include his perception of the employee's qualifications-those reflected on the
application or observed from job performance after hiring.'37 The employer hired and
retained the employee because he believed her to be qualified. Objective and later
discovered knowledge to the contrary should not preclude establishment of her prima
facie case. 3 '
Alternatively, some have argued in the context of application fraud that an employee
lacks standing to advance a claim of employment discrimination because the employee
did not "properly come into the status of employee."'3 Under this reasoning, a court
cannot award relief because the enforcement provisions section of Title VII predicates
remedial action on employee status.44 This argument misunderstands the legal theory
underlying Title VII claims. An employee filing a claim under Title VII does not assert
a right to employment. Indeed, such a claim is without merit in the majority of states due
to the employment at will doctrine. The right asserted by Title VII claimants is the right
to be free from discriminatory action, a right that is statutorily guaranteed. Accordingly,
Title VII and the ADEA confer standing on any person discriminated against by an
employer.' 4' Neither statute contains an exception or waiver of relief for employees who
135. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802), overruledbyMcKennon v.Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
136. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) ('T]he prima facie case 'raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors."' (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))).
137. White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 63.
138. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221,1230 (3d Cir. 1994). The courts imposing the materiality
and reliance standards in evaluating whether an employee would have been fired upon discovery of rdsumn fraud have
themselves discredited this argument based on qualification. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
139. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1185 (11th Cir. 1992) (Godbold, J., dissenting), revg No.
CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL 423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (affd in pan and rev'd in par, 62 F.3d 374 (1Ith Cir.
1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994). Since this argument is premised on the fraudulent procurement of
employment, claims of application rejection and wrongful discharge must be distinguished on the issue of standing.
140. Id at 1188. The enforcement provisions section of Title VII limits remedies to "an individual as an employee."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX2XA) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975)
("Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even




have committed wrongful acts, or for those who are not qualified for the job.'4 2 The
conferral of standing finds support in the common law as well: "Under general tort
principles, even a trespasser is entitled to the benefit of the rule that the offended
landowner may not intentionally injure him."'43
The argument that such an exception or waiver exists under circumstances of after-
acquired evidence improperly injects into a discrimination claim a theory of contractual
wrongful termination.'" Only an employee with an employment contract is entitled to a
job absent just cause for termination, and Title VII and the ADEA assume the more
common at-will employment arrangement.'45 An employee need not establish a property
right in her job to demonstrate injury in an employment discrimination claim.'46
Moreover, regardless of the circumstances under which an individual was hired, a
victim of discrimination has suffered noneconomic injuries to self-esteem and dignity.
The claim that no injury has been suffered ignores the stigmatic harm inflicted by
discrimination, 47 and it emerges from a growing perception that discrimination is no
longer a pervasive societal harm.' 4' In addition, courts applying the after-acquired
evidence defense disregard the psychological injury previously recognized in
discrimination litigation. 149 Instead, the concept of injury has been confined to individual,
economic injury. 5° This narrow definition of injury suffered as a result of discriminatory
practices is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of federal antidiscrimination statutes
and the reaffirmation by Congress that employment discrimination persists as a societal
problem requiring continued efforts of eradication.
Although the Court did not directly address the issue of standing in McKennon, it
emphasized the compensatory objective of the ADEA and Title VII, and it equated
discrimination with injury.'5' The Court's focus on the purpose of federal
antidiscrimination statutes, and its conclusion that their objectives "are furthered when
even a single employee establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or
her,"' 52 eliminates arguments that after-acquired evidence creates a lack of standing or
injury." 3 In short, these subsidiary arguments cannot bar recovery for the same policy
reasons that the Court dismissed the application of unclean hands.
142. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1231; Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J. 1993)
("There is nothing in the statute itself to support a requirement that the job had been acquired honestly."); Kenneth G.
Parker, Note, Afier-Acquired Evidence in Employment Disdriminalion Cases: A Stale of Disarray, 72 TEX. L. REV. 403,
428 (1993).
143. Velch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir. 1994) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
144. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1231 n.16 (noting that fraudulent inducement renders a contract voidable); see also White
& Brussack, supra note 118, at 59-6 1.
145. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1233.
146. Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting at-will employment throughout many
states).
147. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Zemelman, supra note 106, at 194.
149. Prce Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, ., concurring) (discussing the harms caused by discriminatory
evaluation processes); see also White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 75-76; Zemelman, supra note 106, at 200 (observing
the trend toward perceiving discrimination cases as contract and tort actions that involve economic loss).
150. Zemelman, supra note 106, at 200; see White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 75-76 ("That the discrimination
may result in no out-of-pocket loss makes it no less painful an alfront."); cf Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
421 (1975) ("[A] worker's injury is no less real simply because his employer did not inflict it in 'bad faith."').
151. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884 ('Compensation for injuries caused by the prohibited discrimination is another
[objective].').
152. Id. at 885.
153. Accord Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995).
[V/ol. 71:235
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
b. The Clean Hands Doctrine
Some proponents of the Summers rule, including the Nashville Banner Publishing
Company, raised the equitable principle of "clean hands" as a secondary reason to deny
all relief.'54 The doctrine is based on the following principle: "He that hath committed
iniquity shall not have equity."' 55 A plaintiff whose own hands are stained by misconduct
related to the litigated matter will be denied otherwise recoverable relief.,56 Although
originating and being most frequently applied in the context of fraudulent contracts, the
maxim includes any unconscionable conduct, even if legal.'57 However, to ensure that the
doctrine is "not a license to destroy the rights of persons whose conduct is unethical,"''
courts impose the "same transaction" limitation: the conduct giving rise to the defense
of unclean hands must be connected to the controversy at bar.'59 Furthermore, the doctrine
of clean hands is applied at the court's discretion and may be overridden by important
public policy concerns. 6 °
In the context of after-acquired evidence, the clean hands defense fails on two levels.
First, the "same transaction" threshold cannot be satisfied. The subject matter of the
litigation is an allegedly discriminatory employment decision made with no knowledge
of that which the employer now claims dirties the plaintiff's hands. The stumbling block
in the Summers mixed-motives analogy-the lapse in time between the employment
decision and the acquisition of legitimate justification-constitutes an insurmountable
obstacle to the subsidiary clean hands doctrine as well, for the plaintiff's acquisition or
retention of employment through inequitable conduct had no bearing on the action for
which the plaintiff seeks redress. The doctrine is founded on the principle that a plaintiff
should not "reap the benefit of his misconduct," and, consequently, if "the right claimed
in the suit did not accrue because of [the misconduct], the misconduct will be held to be
collateral and not to defeat the right to affirmative relief.' 6' Application of the equitable
principle in the context of after-acquired evidence assumes, again inappropriately, an
assertion of a property right in one's job instead of a right to be free from discrimination.
154. Brief for Respondent at 40-42, McKennon (No. 93-1543); see also Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, 23 F.3d 1403,
1405 (8th Cir. 1994) ("We do not believe that an employee should benefit from his or her misrepresentation.");
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) ("There is some equitable appeal for the conclusion that
someone who would not have been hired but for his own fraudulent conduct should not receive any relief from
employment discrimination laws for a later employment decision.").
155. JOHNN. POMEROY, ATREATISE ONEQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941); see
WIUJAMF. WALSH, ATR.ATisEoNEQUrrY 283 n.9 (1930). See generally HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, McCINrOCK ON
EQUITY (2d ed. 1948).
156. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4 (1973); MCCL1NTOCK, supra note 155, at 26;
POMEROY, supra note 155, §§ 397-404; WALSH, supra note 155, at 283 n.9. The clean hands doctrine is applied not for
the benefit of the defendant but for the protection of the court; judicial intervention should not permit one to profit from
one's own misconduct. McCLINTOCK, supra note 155, at 60.
157. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 155, at 59-61; POMEROY, supranote 155, § 401.
158. DOBBS, supra note 156, § 2.4, at 46. The principle seeks to preclude a plaintiff from benefiting from his
misconduct. "What is material is not that the plaintiff's hands are dirty, but that he dirties them in acquiring the right he
now asserts."' Id. (quoting Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1963)).
159. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 155, at 63; POMEROY, supranote 155, § 399.
160. DOBBS, supra note 156, § 2.4, at 46; POMEROY, supra note 155, § 411 (discussing the public policy exception
in cases of plaintiff's illegal, not merely unethical, conduct). Cheryl Zemelman discusses the capacity of public policy to
trump the clean hands doctrine as illustrated in other contexts. She also observes that the defense of unclean hands was
not used in Title VII litigation in the 1960's and early 1970's when discrimination was perceived as a wrong against
society instead of a wrong against an individual. Zemelman, supra note 106, at 197-98.
161. McCUNTOCK, supra note 155, at 64.
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An alternative reasoning is equally flawed. To apply the doctrine in cases of after-
acquired evidence on the basis that an employee would otherwise benefit from her
wrongdoing presumes the unlikely prospect that the employee engaged in misconduct
with the anticipation of unlawful employment practices and a subsequent (and favorable)
discrimination claim. 62 It is not credible to suggest that an employee acted in anticipation
of civil rights damages, and the denial of otherwise appropriate remedies thus serves no
deterrent against dishonesty or other wrongdoing.' 63
To illustrate, consider a man who exaggerated his academic credentials and who
worked until he was terminated, forty years later, in violation of the ADEA. It is unlikely
that at the time of his wrongdoing he even considered his employer's actions four decades
hence. Any potential deterrent effect created by applying the clean hands doctrine was
nullified, for his thoughts never included the possibility that his misrepresentation may
preclude recovery for an uncontemplated discriminatory discharge. Consequently, neither
the elements nor the purpose of the clean hands doctrine is satisfied in the context of
after-acquired evidence. The misconduct comprising the asserted defense of unclean
hands is collateral to the plaintiff's claim of discrimination, and the plaintiff did not
calculate to profit by that legal claim.
Another incongruity exists: the clean hands ddctrine as applied to after-acquired
evidence cases may itself produce inequity. For example, the damage the employer
suffered in McKennon consisted of limited financial and personnel information revealed
to an employee's husband. Mrs. McKennon, however, suffered the loss of ajob and the
psychological injuries sustained from inferior treatment based on age. The disparity in
degrees of injury or wrongdoing undercuts the equitable rationale of the clean hands
doctrine.
Second, the strong public policy underlying federal antidiscrimination law overrides
any application of the equitable maxim as a complete defense.' The McKennon Court
quickly dismissed the equitable argument, noting that it has "rejected the unclean hands
defense 'where private suit serves important public purposes."" 65 Even if denied an
equitable remedy under the doctrine of clean hands, the plaintiff still has a legal
162. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235 n.25 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995).
163. Id. at 1235-36 n.25 ("The applicant's incentive not to be dishonest, and the employee's incentive not to breach
his or her duties of truthfulness, loyalty, and obedience, stem from the fact that he or she is always subject to disciplinary
measures if the employer learns of the wrong outside the context of discovery in an employment discrimination case.");
Massey v. Trump's Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314,323 n.10 (D.NJ. 1993) ("We find it preposterous that an employee
would refrain from lying because she anticipates that she may be illegally discriminated against later and wants to preserve
her right to recover damages.").
164. The Wallace court rejected the clean hands doctrine because its application ignored the effect of Title VII.
Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,1181 n.10 (11th Cir. 1992) (dictum), revg No. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991
WL 423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (affd inpart andrev'd inpart, 62 F.3d 374 (1 1th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (1Ith Cir. 1994). The court opined that, even if applicable, the doctrine was limited by the remedial goals of the
federal statute. Id. But see Women Employed v. Rinella & Rinella, 468 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. I1. 1979) (applying clean
hands doctrine as defense to sexual harassment where the employee harassed the employer after her discharge), cited in
Jay P. Krupin, Law of the Workplace, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 24,1994, at 29.
165. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885 (quoting Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138
(1968)). As the Mardell court had stated earlier, to reason that an employee who was subject to discriminatory acts of an
employer yet himself engaged in wrongdoing suffered no legal injury "defie[d] common sense." Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1231.
Put more dramatically, to maintain that a victim of employment discrimination has suffered no injury is
to deprecate the federal right transgressed and to heap insult ("You had it coming") upon injury. A victim
of disrimination suffers a dehumanizing injury as real as, and often of far more severe and lasting harm
than, a blow to the jaw.
Id. at 1232 (citation omitted).
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remedy-a remedy unaffected by the equitable doctrine, provided by Title VII, and
indeed, mandated by its policy goals.'66
3. Separating Issues of Liability and Remedy
The Supreme Court has elsewhere recognized the need to separate the liability and
remedial phases in employment discrimination litigation. These cases also illustrate the
potentially broad and damaging application of the Summers rule.
Class action suits are the best example of the private attorney general model of Title
VII enforcement. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 67 the district court'found
racially discriminatory practices to exist, but the sole named class representative was
subsequently fired for cause. On appeal, the employer argued mootness since the class
representative was not entitled to relief and thus no longer had a personal stake in the
outcome. 6 However, the Court separated the issues of liability and remedy, holding that
the rights of the class members were the subject of further litigation.,69 If the facts had
included after-acquired evidence and the clean hands doctrine were to apply, the class
representative would have been denied the opportunity to vindicate the rights of his class
members. Therefore, those class members would have received no remedy for their
otherwise recoverable injuries.
Similarly, a potential complete bar to liability could have serious implications in
disparate impact cases. Courts impose liability under a disparate impact theory to redress
and eradicate systemic discrimination. For instance, the requirement that employees
possess a high school diploma or pass a standardized intelligence test unrelated to
successful job performance as a condition for employment or transfer was found to be
discriminatory, although facially neutral.1'7 Suppose the complainant has falsely claimed
to possess a high school degree in order to obtain employment and was denied a transfer
years later upon failure to pass the standardized test. As part of its preparation to defend
against a discrimination claim, the employer learned of the employee's true educational
background. In a court following the Summers rule, the employer would escape liability
for racial discrimination, and many other employees and applicants would be subject to
the continued discriminatory practice. Comparable to the class representative, the
disparate impact complainant would be denied the opportunity to act as private attorney
general and the goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace would be frustrated. 171
The failure of the Summers per se rule to provide any relief to a victim of proven
discrimination, whether under legal, procedural, or equitable arguments of causation,
standing, or injury, respectively, renders the rule inconsistent with federal
antidiscrimination policy and statutory provisions. The arguments wielded in support of
the complete defense approach are fundamentally similar, for they are constructed upon
166. See DOBBS, supra note 156, § 2.4, at 45-46 (recognizing that the remedial defense may operate substantively
due to res judicata rules). Professor Chafee believed that this principle of equity was unnecessary since the cases to which
it was applied were always capable ofsolution under some more specific rule. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity
with Clean Hands, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 876, 1065 (1949).
167.424 U.S. 747 (1976).
168. Id.
169. Id; cf Sivley, supra note 44, at 424-25 (stating that M. Healthy can be read as addressing remedy, not liability).
170. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197 1). The disparity in test performances was attributed to the inferior
education received as a result of prior discrimination. 161 at 430.
171. In the McKennon opinion, Justice Kennedy alluded to the threat that such a defense poses to class action and
disparate impact suits. See supra text accompanying note 129.
1995]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
a legal fiction: the denial of all remedies assumes an absence -or negation of
discriminatorily created injury due to the existence of employee wrongdoing. Before
McKennon, courts rejecting the doctrine of Summers and its progeny recognized the
problem of employee misconduct but not at the exclusion of redressing the real and
serious damage resulting from discriminatory practices. Determining which remedies are
appropriate in the'context of mutual wrongdoing was the focus of these jurisdictions.
B. Measuring Appropriate Damages in Light of
Employee Misconduct
Refusing to allow after-acquired evidence to act as a bar to all liability, the Supreme
Court limited the consideration of this evidence to the remedial phase of litigation.172 In
so holding, the Court sought both to preserve employer prerogatives and to grant make-
whole relief to a victim of discrimination. It also recognized the fact-sensitive nature of
after-acquired evidence litigation."
The Court provided general guidelines as to appropriate types of relief, but it did not
address as thoroughly as did the Eleventh Circuit the various remedies, nor the standard
of proof required for theemployer to present the after-acquired evidence. The Court
denied remedies of front pay and reinstatement, awarded backpay, mentioned attorney's
fees only briefly, and did not discuss injunctive relief. The materiality standard operating
in the lower courts resurfaced in the Court's requirement that an employer first establish
that the employee's wrongdoing was "of such severity that the employee in fact would
have been terminated on those grounds alone." 74
In comparison, under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, the employer must prove by the
preponderance of the evidence whether and in what manner the after-acquired evidence
would have legitimately influenced the employment relationship. 75 The court then
fashions the relief accordingly. Wallace held that reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive
relief are unavailable if the employer proves that the after-acquired evidence provides a
legitimate reason for termination, but that backpay, declaratory relief, attorney's fees, and
nominal damages remain available. 76 Although not without its flaws, the Wallace
approach is more consistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and better preserves the
goals of federal antidiscrimination law.' 77 A brief outline of the remedial provisions of
Title VII and the ADEA furnishes the background necessary to evaluate the features of
the Supreme Court's and the Eleventh Circuit's remedy-specific treatment of after-
acquired evidence.
172. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
173. "The proper boundaries of remedial relief in [aRer-acquired evidence] cases.., must be addressed by the judicial
system in the ordinary course of further decisions, for the factual permutations and the equitable considerations they raise
will vary from case to case." Id
174. I at 886-87 (emphasis added); see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing materiality standard).
175. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (1 Ith Cir. 1992), rev'g No. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL
423977 (ND. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (qafd in part and rev "d in part, 62 F.3d 374 (1 Ith Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
( Ith Cir. 1994).
176. Id. at 1181-83.
177. The Wallace court did not consider the Civil Rights Act of 1991 since the suit commenced prior to its passage
and neither party argued its applicability. The court did note, however, that its opinion was consistent with the Act's
treatment of mixed-motives litigation. Id. at 1184 n.17. The Seventh Circuit also recognized that the Act was "perhaps
inconsistent with Summers," but did not address this tension since neither party cited the Act. Washington v. Lake County,
969 F.2d 250, 255 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992).
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1. Remedies Available Under Title VII and the ADEA
The ADEA is a hybrid of Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA");11 its prohibitions are modeled after Title VII and its enforcement provisions
incorporate by reference those of the FLSA.' As remedial and humanitarian legislation,
the ADEA should be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative intent of eliminating
age discrimination."' Making no exceptions in its conferral of standing, "[a]ny person
aggrieved" may bring a claim under the ADEA.'
Both Title VII and the ADEA provide legal and equitable remedies to effectuate their
purposes.3 2 In fact, the ADEA incorporates the FLSA provision that employers "shall be
liable" for unpaid wages, while backpay available under Title VII is a matter of equitable
discretion."' Neither the FLSA nor the ADEA expressly provides for front pay damages,
and many criticize its speculative nature.'" However, front pay may be available under
the ADEA as part of the discretionary equitable relief, and the factual circumstances of
an ADEA claim-namely, that the years until retirement are few-diminish
speculation."" Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 makes available compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII,'" while the ADEA provides liquidated damages in
cases of "willful violations.""' 7
178.29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
179. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582-84 (1978); Whitten v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Kan.
1991); H.L REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2218. The ADEA
enforcement provision states: "The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the power, remedies
and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 ... and 217 of this tide." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (listing FLSA
enforcement provisions).
180. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that expiration of 180-day time limitation
did not estop plaintiff from bringing suit under ADEA), aff d, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978).
181.29 U.S.C. § 626(cXl).
182. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that where a plaintiffshows the presence of an impermissible motive and
the employer proves that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory factor
[Tihe court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief(except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this tide; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX2)(B).
Remedies under the ADEA are as follows:
[Sluch legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
183. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (emphasis added).
184. Kotkin, supra note 43, at 1377; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Award of "Front Pay" Under § 7 of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 74 A.L.R. FED. 745,750 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
185. Landis, supra note 184, at 750-51. The courts are split as to the availability offront pay under the ADEA. It may
be available in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits
are unsettled. ld
186. § 102,105 Stat. at 1072-74; see Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Damages Under the Civil Rihts Act of 1991, C932 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 773, 775 (1994). Under the new law, plaintiffs in Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act actions
may also seek compensatory and punitive damages. Id at 775-76.
187.29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
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2. The Denial of Prospective Remedies
a. Reinstatement and Front Pay
Concluding that after-acquired evidence is properly considered in the remedial phase
of litigation, the McKennon Court denied as a general rule the prospective remedies of
reinstatement"' and front pay"9 if an employer demonstrates that it would have fired the
employee had it known of the wrongdoing earlier.'" This was the position of most courts
following the remedy-specific approach,' 9' as well as that of the EEOC. 92 The denial of
these remedies is consistent with employer prerogatives preserved by federal
antidiscrimination statutes. 93 The intent of Title VII and the ADEA to balance employee
rights and employer privileges 9 ' must be considered in conjunction with their goal of
make-whole compensation. If courts reinstate or award front pay to an employee, despite
the knowledge of misconduct proven to justify rejection or discharge, they deny the
employer the freedom to execute lawful employment decisions. 95 Notwithstanding the
means by which the information was obtained, the employer now possesses a legitimate
reason for the adverse employment decision. As the court observed "It would be both
inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have
terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds."' 96
Also, although irrelevant to the motive present at the time of discharge, the after-
acquired evidence of fraud or misconduct will significantly affect any future relations
between the two parties. Reinstatement in the context of after-acquired evidence is
188. For a good discussion of the history, developments, and limitations of reinstatement, see Martha S. West, The
Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
189. Front pay is generally awarded when reinstatement is not feasible after a discriminatory discharge and the
plaintiff has not secured comparable employment. The rationale for the remedy is to compensate for lost employment
opportunities, thereby providing make-whole relief and deterrent effect. Kotkin, supra note 43, at 1376-77.
190. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886. This decree adopts the "same decision" standard articulated earlier in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and legislatively affirmed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See H.R.R..
No. 40, supra note 53, at pt. 1, 48-49, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 586-87 (explaining § 203 of the new legislation);
see also supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
191. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (dictum), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
1397 (1995); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991,995 (D. Or. 1994) (opining in dicta that a discharged "doctor"
who never attended medical school would not be entitled to reinstatement); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino,
828 F. Supp. 314 (D.NJ. 1993). But see Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240 (suggesting in dicta that reinstatement may be barred
only if the after-acquired evidence rendered it "particularly invasive" of the employer's prerogatives); EEOC v. Farmer
Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that reinstatement may be appropriate if the fraud occurred
decades earlier and under sympathetic circumstances).
192. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Decision No. 915-002, Revised Enforcement Guidance on Recent
Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, 1992 WL 189088 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement
Guidance].
193. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (underscoring that an "important aspect of [Title Vil] is its preservation of
an employer's remaining freedom of choice').
194. Id. at 243.
195. Federal laws limit the employment-at-will doctrine only to the extent necessary to achieve antidiscrimination
goals. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1233 n.20.
196. McKenon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995); cf. Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.,
876 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (dictum) ("[l]t would hardly make sense to order [a discharged employee]
reinstated to a job which he lied to get and from which he properly could be discharged for that lie."). The denial of
reinstatement and front pay is also consistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 enforcement provisions relating to mixed
motives. Mandating the availability of legal damages if a discriminatory motive was present, the 1991 Act specifically
denies reinstatement and front pay if the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same action absent the
impermissible motive. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
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particularly impracticable given the animosity between the parties.", Title VII arose from
an interest in promoting amicable, and therefore productive, working environments.," To
compel reinstatement of an employee discovered to have deceived or even caused injury
to the employer would only create hostility and be detrimental to both parties.
Furthermore, as Wallace recognized, awarding reinstatement and front pay often places
an employee in a better position than if no discrimination had occurred."9 These remedies
go beyond the make-whole objective of Title VII.2se Therefore, when courts deny these
remedies, they preserve the balance between employer and employee rights and
demonstrate their unwillingness to condone employee misconduct. 20'
b. Injunctive Relief
The prospective remedy of injunctive relief,0 2 a remedy less uniformly denied by
subsequent courts, 213 was also unavailable in Wallace. With little discussion the Eleventh
Circuit dismissed the possibility of injunctive relief as a logical result of its dehial of
reinstatement: an employee no longer working for the employer is not entitled to
injunctive relief against further unlawful practices. 214 In support of its conclusion, the
court cited its previous holding that if a Title VII plaintiff were not reinstated, injunctive
relief was "unlikely" since such an injunction would not affect her.205 Equitable relief
requires the balancing of equities; the benefits of an injunction to the plaintiff must
outweigh the harm to the defendant. 26 The court apparently reasoned that injunctive
relief was inappropriate since no benefit inured to the discharged employee. Although the
197. See West, supra note 188, at 4. West argues that the remedy is ineffective since few employees accept
reinstatement and those who do often resign or are discharged within two years of reinstatement. Her argument is strongly
supported by empirical data noted in the National Labor Relations Act. Id at 28-30.
198. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("The broad, overriding interest, shared by
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral
employment and personnel decisions."); see also David A. Cathcart et al., The Civil Rights Act of 1991, C932 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 23,41 (1994) (stating that Title VII was previously structured on a traditional labor model emphasizing employer-
employee relations). However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 bases Title VII and the ADEA on a tort model. Id. This
transformation is consistent with the perceptual shift in discrimination litigation which more recently views discriminatory
employment practices as tort-like injuries against individuals rather than wrongs against society. See Zemelman, supra
note 106.
199. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,1182 (11th Cir. 1992), revgNo. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL
423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (affrd inpart and rev'd in par, 62 F.3d 374 (1 th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
(11th Cir. 1994). One should note that in many cases the discovery of after-acquired evidence is a result of the
discriminatory act and ensuing litigation. See. e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir.
1993) (employee admitted to misconduct during deposition), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 875 (1995); Wallace, 968 F.2d 1174
(employee admitted in deposition to prior conviction); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th
Cir. 1988) (falsifications uncovered during and as part of trial preparation), overruled by McKennon, 115 S. Ct. 879;
O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992) (unauthorized removal of files disclosed
during deposition); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (employee submitted copies
of employer's confidential records in response to document production request). Had no discrimination occurred, the
employer could quite possibly never have discovered the wrongdoing.
200. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182.
201. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1239 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995).
202. Injunctive relief may consist of requiring an employer to post notices informing its employees that one's protected
status will not affect employment decisions, or to counsel and/or discipline those officials who acted with illegal animus.
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 192, at *12 n.30.
203. See, e.g., Mardell, 31 F3d at 1240 n.35 (opining that injunctive relief may still be available even if no back pay
were due); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 324 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that all remedies
except reinstatement and front pay remain available).
204. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182; see also White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 91 (stating that a plaintffwho is not
entitled to reinstatement lacks the standing to enforce the terms of the injunction).
205. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1 lth Cir. 1982)).
206. WmLiAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAML J. LEECH, EMeLOYMENT TERMINATION 345 (1985).
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court's remedy-specific approach itself recognizes the primary issue of employment
discrimination in after-acquired evidence cases, its rationale for denying injunctive relief
ignores the duality of purpose.
Injunctive relief will not contribute to make the victim of discrimination whole if the
former employee is in no danger of further discrimination by the employer. However, this
solely compensatory focus ignores the second, prophylactic objective of eliminating
discrimination. Injunctive relief may in some circumstances prevent further injury to a
successful plaintiff, yet it also has the potential to prevent future injury to others by an
employer proven to have previously engaged in unlawful conduct.
Under Supreme Court doctrine, injunctive relief is precluded unless there is a
reasonable expectation that discrimination will recur.2" Courts are therefore more willing
to grant injunctive relief if an employer has a pattern of discrimination or no policy
implemented to combat discriminatory practices.2"' In such situations, a victim of
discrimination acts in the interest of society as a private attorney general securing
injunctive relief for the benefit of similarly situated employees. McKennon did not
discuss injunctive relief, leaving the lower court to determine if "extraordinary
circumstances" warrants additional, equitable relief.2" However, to deny injunctive relief
in all after-acquired evidence cases would be inconsistent with federal statutory
objectives.
Under the private attorney general model, even if a discrimination claim arose from a
single incident involving an employer with no practice or pattern of unlawful conduct,
injunctive relief creates little burden on the employer in comparison to the potential
social benefits. Allowing after-acquired evidence to affect remedial relief at all may
actually elevate the danger of recurring discrimination. An employer's ability to lessen
the damages due by locating and presenting evidence of employee misconduct may
diminish the incentive for them to evaluate their employment practices. Employers may
instead view the potential of after-acquired evidence as a method of damage control if
legal action should arise.
The deterrent effect of Title VII's provision of injunctive relief is diminished
significantly if it is unavailable to plaintiffs who would receive no personal benefit. t0
More importantly, a Title VII litigant cannot act as a private attorney general if injunctive
relief is denied simply because it serves no individualized remedial purpose !.2 1 For these
207. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (denying injunction for violation of Clayton Act). "The
necessary determination [to grant injunctive relief] is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation,
something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive." Id at 633.
208. See Thomas v. Washington County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding employer engaged in
discriminatory practices, court granted injunctive relief to one person who was denied employment but remained a
prospective applicant); EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1990) (granting injunctive relief where
discrimination limited to single person but employer continually tolerated such conduct and had no antidiscrimination
policy); Spencer v. General Elee. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying injunction since single incident and employer
implemented antidiscrimination policy); EEOC v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1989) (denying injunctive
relief where the unlawful motive was a single incident, the employer had no pattern of discrimination, and there was no
reason to expect recurrence); Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing injunction where those who had
discriminated remained in supervisory positions but no other evidence of recurring discrimination existed). But see
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C.) (denying injunction since it was unreasonable to place court
in monitoring role given the difficulties in ascertaining sexual stereotyping), aff'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
209. In addition to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, back pay, and front pay, McKennon's comnplaint
sought "other equitable relief to redress the unlawful dismissal." Brief for Petitioner at 4, McKennon (No. 93-1543).
210. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 192, at *7 n.22.
211. See id. ("Although the plaintiffmight not personally benefit from an injunction when (s)he is no longer in the
workforce, the Commission 'acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination."' (quoting
General Tel. Co. of Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980))).
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reasons, courts should generally award injunctive relief even if the plaintiff is not entitled
to reinstatement, and there is little reason to believe that the employer will repeat any
discriminatory action."'
3. Measuring Backpay
The remedial issue which most clearly exposes the fine line between employer
prerogatives and employee rights in cases of after-acquired evidence is that of backpay,
in particular, the date from which to measure any award. The monetary remedy of
backpay effectively advances the twin objectives of deterrence and compensation
common to Title VII and the ADEA."' Unlike the noneconomic injunctive relief or the
prospective equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay, liability for backpay
"'provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers ... to self-examine and to self-
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history.' 214
McKennon holds that backpay is properly awarded to a discrimination victim despite
her previous misconduct,215 but the method of calculating backpay differs from that
advanced by the Eleventh Circuit. McKennon allows recovery of backpay only to the
point the employer actually discovered the employee wrongdoing. In contrast, the
Wallace decision limited the effect of after-acquired evidence on measuring backpay by
extending the backpay period to the time when the employer proves it would have
discovered the employee's misconduct.2t 6 In other words, backpay extends to the date of
judgment unless the employer proves discovery would have occurred legitimately at an
earlier date. This date, the date of inevitable discovery, 2 7 is the approach also advocated
by the EEOC.21' An employer must prove that it would have discovered evidence
justifying the adverse employment decision absent any discriminatory conduct or product
thereof, including legal proceedings or retaliatory actions.2 9 In adopting this date, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected an alternative approach which looks to the date of actual
discovery for two reasons." First, actual discovery often occurs during the course of
212. Id.
213. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995).
214. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (alteration in original, omission added)). See also Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1239 n.32. For a
summary of the legislative history of the backpay remedy, see Kotldn, supra note 43, at 1312-27.
215.McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
216. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,1182 (1 th Cir. 1992), rev gNo. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL
423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (aff'd in part andrev'd inpart, 62 F.3d 374 (1Ith Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
(llth Cir. 1994).
217. Mardell, 31 F3d at 1240. For example, the employer could reduce the potential backpay period by demonstrating
its practice of annually investigating employee work products through which it inevitably would have discovered the
misconduct-absent discriminatory conduct or activities pursuant to ensuing litigation. It is also conceivable that no
backpay would be due in cases of application-rejection if discovery would have occurred prior to hiring. Id at 1240 n.35
(dictum).
218. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 192, at *8. The EEOC suggests further that if the date of discovery
is not known, the backpay award should be reduced by an appropriate percentage based on an assessment of the
approximate date of discovery. Id
219. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240; Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182. The Third Circuit delineated as part of the employer's
burden of proof two elements necessary to terminate prematurely the backpay period. The employer must establish with
reasonable certainty, first, the date of inevitable or independent discovery, and, second, that the employer would have made
the same employment decision at that time. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240 (dictum).
Given its fact-sensitive nature, the issue of premature termination of the backpay period will not often be properly
disposed on summary judgment. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1184.
220. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182.
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litigation, and absent discrimination, the evidence would not have become known to the
employer at that time. Thus, applying the principle of Mt. Healthy, use of the actual date
of discovery would place the employee in a worse position than had no discrimination
taken place. Second, the date of discovery approach would provide a windfall to
employers whose liability is reduced as a result of having engaged in unlawful conduct.22
The inverse is not true: the date of inevitable discovery will not provide a windfall to
employees more skilled at concealing evidence of wrongdoing. While an employer may
have never detected misconduct in the absence of a discrimination suit investigation, the
denial of front pay and reinstatement precludes any windfall to the deceitful employee.
Indeed, to permit after-acquired evidence to affect remedies at all, demonstrates an effort
to balance the competing policies of eradicating employment discrimination and
discouraging employee misconduct.
If the principle enunciated in Mt. Healthy and underlying federal antidiscrimination
statutes-restoring the victim of discrimination to the position she would have occupied
but for the employer's unlawful action-were applied in its purest form, even remedies
of reinstatement and front pay would be available in many cases of after-acquired
evidence. Absent discrimination, the employer would never have learned of the
incriminating evidence discovered solely through litigation. Applying a strict "but-for"
analysis, the courtwould restore the employee to her previous employment status without
consideration of the misconduct, the fruit of the illegal activity. Courts would deny the
employer the opportunity to act subsequently and lawfully upon the later learned
information; they would compel the employer to resume the employment relationship as
if no discovery had been made. For obvious reasons, this absolutist approach is
impractical and unsavory. Aside from forcing an unavoidably hostile working
environment and unduly infringing upon employer rights, this strict adherence to
antidiscrimination principles provides a windfall for crafty employees who effectively
shield traces of their misconduct from inevitable discovery.
Proponents of the date of actual discovery dislike the speculative inquiry inherent in
proving when the after-acquired evidence would have been unearthed. 22  Others contend
that full backpay should not be available if reinstatement is inappropriate since backpay
covers the period prior to reinstatement in providing a make-whole remedy.'m These
advocates argue from an assumption-of-the-risk-rationale: "Anyone who contemplates
bringing an employment discrimination action must weigh the risk that the defendant will
uncover, in preparing for trial, information about the plaintiff that triggers a discharge
policy." 2 4 The potential chilling effect of this argument is troubling.
Considering its potential impact, the date of actual discovery rule departs from the
guidelines originally set forth with respect to awarding backpay.Y25 Permitting an
employer to terminate the period of backpay at the point of actual discovery will frustrate
the central purposes of deterrence and backpay. For example, an employer who faces
charges of discrimination may immediately scrutinize the employee's application with
221. Id.
222. See Mills, supra note 125, at 1548.
223. White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 84.
224. Id.
225. "[G]iven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and maling




the purpose of discovering material misrepresentations and a means of reducing potential
liability."' The efficacy of such a damage control strategy is not 'inconceivable
considering the prevalence of application fraud in this country. 7 Under the date of actual
discovery measurement, information acquired one day after the suit is filed could reduce
liability for backpay to nominal amounts. The deterrent effect of backpay is thereby
virtually eliminated.
The negation of any deterrence is best illustrated by placing the above example in the
context of an ADEA claim and applying the statutory formula for calculating liquidated
damages.2 28 If after-acquired evidence can reduce backpay to a nominal amount, the
doubling of that negligible sum creates little deterrence. In such a situation, neither the
make-whole nor prophylactic imperative of the ADEA has been effectuated. Likewise,
the high standard for recovery of punitive damages under Title VIII renders the
inevitable date of discovery for measuring the appropriate backpay period a necessary,
complementary deterrent.
The date of inevitable discovery prevents abuse of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine's capacity to reduce the period of recoverable backpay. The appropriate time for
employers to scrutinize employment applications is at the time of hiring; yet, despite
evidence to the contrary, employers presume the information contained in the application
is accurate, and they conduct only limited verification procedures.?10 Even employers
supporting the Summers rule recognize that it is in the employer's best interest to
implement procedures to expose dishonest applicants"' and to thoroughly examine an
employee's job performance. These personnel policies would prevent much litigation as
to whether the misconduct would have justified sanction or would have been discovered
as a matter of routine procedure.
Moreover, employers who do not engage in such inquiries face potential liability for
negligent hiring. Under this tort theory,
an employer has the duty to use due care to avoid the selection and retention of an
employee [when] it knows or should know he would endanger fellow employees on the
job. This duty requires the employer to make reasonable inquiry and investigation into
an employee's character and background both prior and subsequent to his
employment. 2
The employment procedures that would lessen the speculation of proving a date of
inevitable discovery are already advisable to avoid liability for negligent hiring and
retention. They also best deter against employee misconduct, for they deny the benefit
sought by engaging in the misconduct, namely acquisition and retention of employment.
Therefore, imposing upon the employer the burden of proving that it would have
discovered the liability-limiting evidence legitimately and independently from any aspect
of litigation is not undue, and it best preserves the important function of the backpay
remedy.
In adopting the date of actual discovery approach, the Supreme Court advances a
position inconsistent with its earlier analysis of employer liability. As discussed above,
226. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 15.
228. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
229. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
230. Mesritz, supra note 16, at 215-16.
231.Id. at 223.
232. Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
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the Court's calculation of backpay creates an incentive for employers to search for
evidence of prior wrongdoing if and when facing a discrimination claim. To reward these
efforts by reducing a potential backpay award diminishes the deterrent effects of the
statutory enforcement provision. The Court established a standard of materiality and
opined that the alternative mechanisms of attorney's fees and Rule II sanctions would
"deter most abuses." 3 However, these provisions deter abuses in the pleadings only.
They may discourage the assertion of defenses based on trivial infractions, but they will
not deter fishing expeditions for more severe misconduct.? 4 Measuring backpay from the
date of unlawful discharge to the date the employer would have legitimately discovered
the discharge-generating evidence better redresses employee rights without infringing on
employer prerogatives.
4. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides the additional remedies of compensatory and
punitive damages in Title VII claims.' Compensatory damages include "future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other nonpecuniary losses." 6 Punitive damages are now available upon a
showing of "malice or ... reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual." 7 Similarly, the ADEA provides liquidated damages in cases of
willful violations. 238
The Wallace suit commenced prior to the passage of the 1991 Act, and the court did
not consider the effect of after-acquired evidence on compensatory damages.139
Consistent with its position respecting backpay, the EEOC advised that compensatory
damages be limited: by the date of actual discovery.24 The flaw in this position is the
same as discussed in reference to declaratory relief-the damage suffered due to
discrimination is not minimized or negated by one's own previous wrongdoing.24'
Pecuniary loss (backpay) is properly limited by the inevitable date of discovery since
employee misconduct, not discrimination, is the reason for continued unemployment.
24 2
In contrast, the employee's conduct did not contribute to the psychological harms
233. MeKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 887 (1995).
234. Again, an employer's thorough review of an employee's performance is not, in itself, objectionable. To engage
in these investigations as a post hoe defense strategy, however, violates the principles and undermines the effectiveness
of federal antidiscrimination law.
235. Fitzpatrick, supra note 186, at 775. The Act places caps on these damages based upon the size of the employer.
Id. at 776.
236.42 U.S.C. § 198la(bX3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Backpay is explicitly excluded from compensatory damages.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 186, at 776.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX2).
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that the 7hurston definition of willful---that "the
employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the
[statute]"---applies to all disparate treatment cases under the ADEA. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993)
(referring to Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)).
239. Wallacev. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1184 n.17 (11th Cir. 1992), revg No. CIVA.90-AR-0983-S, 1991
WL 423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (affdinpart and rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (1 1th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (1Ith Cir. 1994).
240. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 192, at *8.
241. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
242. Admittedly, the initial unemployment results from discriminatory discharge or rejection, but absent the employee
misconduct, reinstatement and full backpay would be available. Full backpay is measured to the date ofjudgment.
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suffered as a result of inferior treatment.243 Indeed, the employee's misconduct has no
bearing on the degree of noneconomic injury, and a showing of inevitable discovery
cannot prematurely terminate the compensatory damage award. Furthermore, these
nonpecuniary harms may extend beyond the date of actual or inevitable discovery of
after-acquired evidence. Therefore, courts should not reduce compensation for those
nonpecuniary injuries. 2"
Wallace did not specifically address punitive damages; however, the majority noted the
similarity between the remedial possibilities under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
("EPA"), 245 and it thus applied its remedy-specific approach to claims under the EPA. The
court's analysis with respect to the EPA liquidated damages provision is also applicable
to the comparable provision in the ADEA. A successful ADEA complainant who proves
willful discrimination is entitled to liquidated damages in the amount of twice the
backpay award.2 46 Although the court acknowledged that a liquidated damage remedy
varies from the make-whole remedial purpose of Title VII, it found this distinction
insignificant and determined that after-acquired evidence had no effect on the availability
of liquidated damages.24 The characterization of the liquidated damages provision as
make-whole relief is inaccurate; it is more aptly described as punitive in nature.24' Given
its deterrent function, liquidated damages are directed at the employer's conduct and,
therefore, after-acquired evidence of the employee's misconduct should not affect an
award of punitive damages.
249
McKennon simply authorizes the trial court to "consider taking into further account
extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either
party." 250 Although the formulation of remedial relief is necessarily fact specific, the
Court's vague directive may do little to restore any degree of uniformity in litigation
involving after-acquired evidence. Even a statement that compensatory and punitive
damages are generally available would have reiterated the central concern of litigation
under federal antidiscrimination statutes.
243. See White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 87 (drawing the distinction between compensatory damages resulting
from employer's discrimination and from plaintiff's status of being unemployed).
244. MIlls, supra note 125, at !556; see also Michael W. Roskiewic, Note, Title VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory
Caps from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Rem ediesfor Employmnent Discrimination, 43 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 391, 414 (1993) (suggesting that since "[v]ictims of severe discrimination often suffer prolonged
emotional and psychological harm," caps on compensatory damages may not adequately cover future medical expenses
and pain and suffering).
245.29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
246. Id. § 626(b).
247. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,1183 (1 Ith Cir. 1992), revgNo. CIV.A.90-AR-0983-S, 1991 WL
423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (aff'd inpart and rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (1 th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
(11th Cir. 1994). After-acquired evidence has the same effect on the availability of liquidated damages as it does on the
effect of the backpay period under Title VII. Ia Since the after-acquired evidence was "irrelevant to the mental state
underlying [the employee]'s discharge," it follows that it does not affect the award of liquidated damages. Id. at 1183 n.14.
248. See Brief for Petitioner at 38-39, McKennon (No. 93-1543) (stating that the legislative history of the ADEA
reveals the intent of Congress that liquidated damages "operate as 'an effective deterrent to willful violations' (citing
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1985)).
249. See White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 87. "The employer who treats his victim 'as less than human' by
maliciously discriminating against her on the basis of, for example, race or sex, is no less a wrongdoer in an after-acquired
evidence case than is the employer's counterpart in a case where no such evidence is discovered" Id. (citation omitted).




Attorney's fees are available under both Title VII"1 and the ADEA"21 and are generally
awarded in employment discrimination cases. 253 They serve a dual purpose of
encouraging private enforcement of civil rights and providing additional assurance that
employers will not deliberately ignore employees' rights." Again, the issue of after-
acquired evidence generates the debate concerning the appropriate period of recovery.
Wallace discussed the effect of after-acquired evidence on attorney fee awards only
indirectly in terms of its effect on the overall judgment. For example, a Title VII plaintiff
must qualify as the "prevailing party" in order to recover attorney's fees."5 The Supreme
Court referred to the award of attorney's fees mandated by the ADEA only in the context
of deterrence against abuse.
256
The Seventh Circuit in Kristufek applied the actual date of discovery to its analysis and
determined that the plaintiff could not recover attorney's fees for the period after which
the employer discovered the incriminating evidence.257 This limitation does not
adequately consider the reason for the employment discrimination suit. A plaintiff
alleging employer discrimination files suit to prove liability, not to discredit an
affirmative defense or counterclaim based on after-acquired evidence. The discovery of
information justifying an employee's dismissal, for instance, does not eliminate the need
for legal representation. Additionally, this temporal consideration fails to draw a rational
line between legal fees attributable to the liability phase versus those attributable to the
remedial phase of the litigation." Any reduction of attorney fee awards based on after-
acquired evidence, regardless of when the employer did or legitimately would have
discovered it, is inconsistent with the premise of the remedy-specific approach that after-
acquired evidence is irrelevant to liability in employment discrimination." 9
251.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
252. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
253. White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 91.
254. Brodin, supra note 50, at 323 n.129 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,257 n.11 (1978)); see also Zemelman,
supra note 106, at 189.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). A plaintiff who is awarded declaratory relief qualifies as a prevailing party if"at a
minimum ... the plaintiff [is] able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between
itself and the defendant." Texas State Teacher's Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (citing
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987)) (awarding attorney's fees to petitioners who obtained judgment vindicating
First Amendment rights in § 1983 action). Attorney's fees are denied if success on a legal claim was purely "technical or
de mninds." ld But see Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,1183 (11 th Cir. 1992) (dictum) (suggesting that a
plaintiff awarded judgment may not necessarily qualify asithe "prevailing party"), revg No. CIVA.90-AR-0983-S, 1991
WL 423977 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 1991) (afdinpart and rev'd in par, 62 F.3d 374 (1 th Cir. 1995)), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (11 th Cir. 1994).
The ADEA provides reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiffs granted '"judgment." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
256. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 887 (1995).
257. Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodserv. Co., 985 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993).
258. Cf White & Brssack, supra note 118, at 91 ("Because after-acquired evidence should have no effect on liability
or on most forms of relief in employment discrimination cases, a prevailing plaintiff should be entitled to recover
attorney's fees generated to prove liability and that the plaintiff's entitlement to these forms of relief exists, even if the fees




IV. THE PROPER TREATMENT OF AFTER-
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
The proper treatment of after-acquired evidence considers the twin objectives of federal
antidiscrimination law-deterrence and compensation-and determines liability and
statutorily provided relief accordingly. McKennon's invalidation of Summers' complete
defense approach properly limits the effect of after-acquired evidence to appropriate
remedies. Employment discrimination litigation seeks to determine the employer's
intent,2"° and hypothetical inquiries into what would have happened does not alter what
did occur. Discharge-generating evidence learned after the adverse employment decision
could not have motivated the actual decision, and it should therefore have no effect on
the issue of liability.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent decision striking down after-acquired
evidence as a bar to liability is consistent with legislative developments in the area of
employment discrimination. The modification of Price Waterhouse to impose liability
upon employers who acted under a discriminatory motive, regardless of whether the same
decision would have been made in its absence, reaffirms the sole focus of Title VII
liability as employment discrimination and not employee culpability. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 also reaffirms the principle that employee rights should not unduly impinge
upon employer prerogatives.
Courts should impose on employers the "would have been fired" standard for all cases
of after-acquired evidence, making no distinction between pre- and post-hiring
misconduct. McKennon involved after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct, but
as the Third Circuit has noted, the Supreme Court used the broad term "wrongdoing"
when discussing the employer's burden of proof.26' In addition to its relevance to the
severity of the misconduct,262 the Court's reasoning and language in McKennon suggests
that the "would have been fired" standard should apply to cases of rdsum6 fraud.263 If an
employer demonstrates that the evidence of misconduct alone would have resulted in
termination or rejection, a court should not award reinstatement and front pay.264
The Court's remedy-specific approach-specifically, the calculation of backpay
according to the actual date of discovery-is inconsistent with statutory objectives and
with principles the Court articulated earlier in its McKennon opinion. The standard of
inevitable discovery promulgated by Wallace better preserves the deterrent function of
recoverable backpay.
260
260. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1977).
261. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., No. 93-9258, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18611, at *2 (3d Cir. July 20, 1995)
(per curiam).
262. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
263. Nevertheless, disagreement as to the proper standard has already emerged in the lower courts. See, e.g., Shattuck
v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying "would have fired" standard to after-acquired evidence
of r&um6 ftaud); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374 (1 Ith Cir. 1995) (same); Quillen v. American Tobacco Co.,
874 F. Supp. 1285 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (applying "would not have hired" standard to after-acquired evidence of rdsum
fraud).
264. The Sixth Circuit recently interpreted the Court's language regarding reinstatement simply as a general rule. See
Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, it remanded the issue of
reinstatement "for further factual determination and a balancing of equities in light of... McKennon." Id at 1155.
265. See supra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
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As lower courts follow the Supreme Court's vague directive to consider "extraordinary
circumstances" when fashioning the order for relief," after-acquired evidence should not
preclude injunctive relief nor have any effect on awards of compensatory and punitive
damages. Injunctive relief and punitive damages serve important deterrent functions, and
compensatory damages are necessary to make the victim of discrimination whole.267
Neither full recovery of attorney's fees nor the reduction based on an actual discovery
standard is consistent with the balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives. An alternative approach will most appropriately allocate attorney's fees,
albeit in an administratively more difficult manner. Plaintiffs against whom employers
make claims of after-acquired evidence should record which fees are generated by the
liability phase and which result from the remedial phase of litigation. If an employer can
show that it would have fired the employee had it known of the information it later
discovered, only those fees attributable to the liability claim are recoverable.
The Supreme Court has approved of and even suggested similar allocation schemes in
the context of Title VII litigation. In complex civil rights claims where the plaintiff may
have limited success in identifying some unlawful practices or conditions, the Court
advised district courts to use equitable discretion and suggested that they identify specific
hours that should be eliminated from an award of attorney's fees. 211 Similarly, a plaintiff
may base her claims on different facts and legal theories, and may prevail on only some
of those claims. "The congressional intent to limit [fee] awards to prevailing parties
requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate
lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim." 69
The method of allocation proposed in the context of after-acquired evidence in effect
treats the liability and remedial phases of the litigation as separate lawsuits.
This proposed scheme balances employer prerogatives with employee rights by
focusing on the reason rather than the time for which the fees are necessitated.
Additionally, predicating the reduction of attorney fee awards upon satisfaction of the
"same decision" standard avoids creating perverse incentives for employers. To deny
recovery of all fees generated by the litigation of after-acquired evidence would
encourage employers to offer minor infractions as legitimate reasons for discharge or
rejection. First, an employer may have little to lose by taking advantage of any
opportunity to reduce its liability. As a related consequence for the employee, the threat
of incurring substantial attorney's fees in defending against claims of after-acquired
evidence may discourage potential plaintiffs from filing meritorious discrimination
claims. If an employer is liable for the plaintiffs attorney's fees only if it fails to
establish that the misconduct provides a legitimate basis for the employment decision, an
employer will advance only the more credible claims of after-acquired evidence.
Finally, regardless of whether proof of inevitable discovery significantly reduces the
damage award to a nominal amount, a victim of proven employment discrimination is
266. Sending a case back to the district court for a-determination of backpay consistent with McKennon, the Third
Circuit made "no effort at this juncture to adumbrate the contours of the 'extraordinary equitable circumstances' doctrine."
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins., No. 93-3258, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18611, at *4 n.4 (3d Cir. July 20, 1995) (per
curiam) (quoting McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886).
267. See supra notes 202-212, 235-50 and accompanying text.
268. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1983). "The plaintiff often may succeed in identifying some
unlawful practices or conditions," but "the range of possible success is vast;" the status of a prevailing party "may say little
about whether the expenditure of counsel's time was reasonable in relation to the success achieved." Id. at 436.
269. Id. at 435.
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entitled to declaratory relief.27 Declaratory relief may generate adverse public reaction,
and the public record of the violation is available to future complainants to establish a
pattern of the employer's unlawful decisionmaking.27 ' "It is in the interest of American
society as a whole to assure that equality of opportunity in the workplace is not polluted
by unlawful discrimination. Even the smallest victory advances that interest."
272
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in McKennon has restored focus in employment
discrimination claims involving after-acquired evidence. As the Court's unanimous ruling
underscored, the Summers' complete defense approach cannot be reconciled with the
mandates and objectives of federal antidiscrimination statutes. The original purpose of
Title VII provides the touchstone to resolving the issues generated by after-acquired
evidence. The per se rule and the procedural and equitable arguments offered in its
support diverted attention away from the violative behavior of employers which the
federal statutes seek to redress and eradicate. The enforcement of the statutorily
guaranteed right to be free from discrimination should not be erroneously qualified upon
collateral issues of employee culpability. These issues are more properly addressed in the
hiring and evaluation procedures of individual employers.
If proper enforcement of these statutes is inadequate to address the problem of
employee misconduct, McKennon may prompt a legislative response. For example,
Congress may incorporate after-acquired evidence considerations into the enforcement
or remedial provisions of the statutes, or may provide separate avenues of relief for
employers who have been objects of employee misconduct.z 3 However, courts should not
dilute the enforcement mechanisms of federal statutes by denying in instances of after-
acquired evidence the award of injunctive relief or compensatory and punitive damages
otherwise available. As they apply McKennon's remedy-specific approach of after-
acquired evidence, federal courts must preserve the Supreme Court's restoration of
antidiscrimination principles. Only the most strict judicial enforcement of an employee's
statutory rights can advance the individual and societal interest in eradicating
discrimination in the. workplace.
270. See White & Brussack, supra note 118, at 91. The entitlement to declaratory relief renders moot any question
of ordering trials involving after-acquired evidence. Justice Ginsburg during oral argument questioned whether remedial
issues were to be litigated first, to determine-based upon the amount of recoverable damages-whether litigation of
liability was necessary. High Court Hears Arguments in Age Discrimination Suit, supra note 23.
271. Brodin, supra note 50, at 324 n.129.
272. HR. REP. NO. 40, pt. 1, supra note 53, at 47, reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 584-85 (testimony of Jane Lang,
a Washington, D.C. attorney and former General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development).
273. Currently, Title VII contains no reference to after-acquired evidence. See White & Brusasak, supra note 118,
at 88 n.184 ("Te legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is silent in all respects on the question of after-acquired
evidence").
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